The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany
Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.
Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion
1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)
1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)
1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.
2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.
南宁市国有资产管理条例
广西壮族自治区人大常委会
南宁市国有资产管理条例
广西壮族自治区人大常委会
（1993年12月16日南宁市第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十三次会议通过 1994年4月2日广西壮族自治区第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第八次会议批准）
目 录
第一章 总 则
第二章 国有资产产权登记
第三章 国有资产的处置
第四章 国有资产的收益
第五章 国有资产的评估
第六章 股份制企业中国有资产的管理
第七章 中外合资、合作企业中国有资产的管理
第八章 法律责任
第九章 附 则
第一章 总 则
第一条 为了发展社会主义市场经济，维护国有资产所有者和经营者的合法权益，防止国有资产流失，保证国有资产的保值增值，根据国家有关法律、法规，结合南宁市的实际情况，制定本条例。
第二条 本条例所称国有资产是指国家依据法律取得的，或由国家资金投入、资产收益、接受馈赠而取得的固定资产、流动资产、无形资产和其他形态的资产。
第三条 国家是国有资产的所有者。国家机关、企业事业单位、社会团体和其他经济组织对国有资产依法享有占有、使用权。
第四条 南宁市国有资产实行国家所有，分级管理，南宁市国有资产行政管理部门是专司国有资产管理的主管部门。
第五条 南宁市管理的国有资产适用于本条例，但对土地、水、矿产等自然资源的管理除外。
第二章 国有资产产权登记
第六条 国有资产产权登记是指国有资产行政管理部门代表国家对国有资产进行登记，依法确认国家对国有资产的所有权以及国家机关、企业事业单位、社会团体和其他经济组织占有、使用国有资产的法律行为。
第七条 凡是占有、使用国有资产的国家机关、企业事业单位、社会团体和其他经济组织应当向同级国有资产行政管理部门申报和办理产权登记手续。经审查符合条件的，发给《国有资产授权占用证书》。尚未成立国有资产行政管理部门的县（区），由市国有资产行政管理部门或者其
委托的机构办理产权登记手续。
第八条 国有资产产权登记是企业工商年检的必备手续，应每周年进行一次年检，以确认国有资产的资本金。
第九条 办理国有资产产权登记应当提交以下文件：
（一）主管部门的批文（包括企业法人代表的任职批文）；
（二）经主管部门批准的企业组织章程副本；
（三）占有国有资产的合同或协议书以及划拨资产的银行转帐单；
（四）资金来源的证明；
（五）《国有土地使用证》及有关土地资产的证明；
（六）其他文件；
办理年检、变更、注销登记的，应当提供有关财务报表、有关单位的批文和其他有关资料。
第三章 国有资产的处置
第十条 国有企业根据生产经营的需要，对固定资产单台（套）原值在五万元以下或者固定资产总值其原值在二十万元以下的有偿转让，可以自主决定。在转让后十五日内必须报同级国有资产行政管理部门备案。对固定资产单台（套）原值在五万元以上或者固定资产总值其原值在二十
万元以上的有偿转让，需经同级国有资产行政管理部门批准。
国有企业可以根据生产经营的需要自主决定出租本企业单位的固定资产，并在出租行为发生后十五日内报同级国有资产行政管理部门备案。
第十一条 国有资产行政管理部门对申报固定资产有偿转让的，应在接到申报后的十五日内批复。有特殊情况需要延长的，经市国有资产行政管理部门批准，可以延长十五日。逾期不批复的，申报单位可以自行处理。
国有资产行政管理部门对申报固定资产的有偿转让不予批准的，申报单位可以向上一级国有资产行政管理部门或同级人民政府申请复议。上一级国有资产行政管理部门或同级人民政府的复议是最终的决定。
第十二条 企业单位合并或者分立，应当到国有资产行政管理部门办理有关产权变更登记手续。经市人民政府批准在全民所有制企业范围内合并的，可以采取企业兼并的形式进行，并报国有资产行政管理部门进行产权变更界定。
第十三条 行政事业单位合并、分立或者撤销时，各方必须先进行财产清查，然后按市人民政府的有关规定进行合并、分立或者移交，并报经同级国有资产行政管理部门办理财产划转手续。
第十四条 市属国家机关、企事业单位、社会团体及其他经济组织的建筑物、机器设备单台原值在二万元以上；县（区）所属国家机关、企事业单位、社会团体及其他经济组织的建筑物、机器设备单台原值在一万元以上的调拨、变卖、报废，需报经同级国有资产行政管理部门审批。市
属单位对建筑物、机器设备单台原值在二万元以下的，县（区）属单位在一万元以下的，调拨、变卖、报废由主管部门审批。并在建筑物、机器设备调拨、变卖、报废发生后十五日内报同级国有资产行政管理部门备案。
第十五条 国家机关、企事业单位、社会团体及其他经济组织占有、使用国有资产所产生的增值资金，其管理办法依照国家规定的财务制度执行。
第十六条 国家机关、企事业单位、社会团体及其他经济组织的国有资产出租时间超过三个月的，应当在出租后十五日内报同级国有资产行政管理部门及财政行政管理部门备案。
在本条例公布前已出租的财产，应当按前款规定补办手续。
第四章 国有资产的收益
第十七条 国有资产的收益指国家因投入资金或者资产依法取得的收益，包括这些资金或资产投入后形成的增值部分。
第十八条 企业中属于国家享有的资产收益以及国有企业整体资产变卖收益等由国有资产行政管理部门监缴同级财政。
第十九条 国家机关、企事业单位、社会团体及其他经济组织运用国有资产进行发包、出租、联营等形式进行创收，应按照国有资产行政管理部门的有关规定进行资产评估，并按照国家有关规定收取国有资产占用费，上缴同级财政，作为国有资产保值增值基金。
第二十条 非全民所有制企业占用的国有资产，按照国家有关规定实行产权界定，由国有资产行政管理部门按国家有关规定收取国有资产占用费，上缴同级财政，作为国有资产保值增值基金。
第五章 国有资产的评估
第二十一条 国有资产占有、使用单位有下列情形之一者，必须进行资产评估：
（一）资产拍卖、转让、租赁；
（二）企业兼并、出售、联营、股份经营；
（三）与外国公司和其他经济组织或者个人开办的中外合资合作企业；
（四）企业清算；
（五）依照国家有关规定需要进行资产评估的其他情形。
第二十二条 国有资产占有、使用单位有下列情形之一者，可以进行资产评估：
（一）资产抵押及其担保；
（二）企业租赁；
（三）需要进行资产评估的其他情形。
第二十三条 国有资产评估按照下列程序进行：
（一）申请立项；
（二）资产清查；
（三）评定估算；
（四）验证确认。
第二十四条 从事国有资产评估业务的单位必须是持有自治区国有资产行政管理部门颁发的国有资产评估资格证书的资产评估机构。
第二十五条 从事国有资产评估业务的单位应当公正廉洁，按照国家规定的评估方法进行有偿服务。
国有资产评估机构的评估结果经过国有资产行政管理部门确认后，任何部门或者个人未经国有资产行政管理部门同意，不得以低于评估结果的价值处理国有资产。
第六章 股份制企业中国有资产的管理
第二十六条 股份制企业的国有资产包括国家股、国有法人股以及未入股的其他国有资产。
国家股为有权代表国家投资的政府部门或机构以国有资产向股份制企业投资形成的股份（含现有已投入企业的国有资产折成的股份）。
国有法人股是全民所有制企业用国家授予其自主经营的国有资产向独立于自己的股份制企业投资所形成的股份。
国家股和国有法人股均属国家所有，统称国有资产股（以下简称国有股）。
股份制企业未入股的其他国有资产是指全民所有制企业改组成股份制企业时因某些原因未入股，由国有资产行政管理部门委托其专项管理有偿使用的国有资产，包括经营性资产和非经营性资产。
第二十七条 全民所有制企业改组为股份制企业时，应向国有资产行政管理部门提出申请和进行资产评估。
第二十八条 股份制企业每年工商年检应先由国有资产行政管理部门出具国有股的资信证明，后由注册会计事务所出具企业的验资证明。
第二十九条 股份制企业中的国家股股权代表由国有资产行政管理部门委派。国有法人股的股权代表由投资入股的法人委派。股权代表直接向委派单位负责。
第三十条 国家股股利由国有资产行政管理部门组织收取，上缴国库，不得中间截留。国有法人股股利由投资入股的法人组织收取，其使用按国家有关规定处置。
第三十一条 改变国有股权在应由国家控股的股份制企业中的比例，国有股权代表必须报经国有资产行政管理部门或者其授权机构会同有关部门按国家有关规定审核后方可执行。把国有资产折股出售的，其办法按国家的有关规定执行。
第三十二条 国有股拥有与其他股份同等的权利和义务，任何人或组织不得以任何理由侵犯国有股的权益。
第七章 中外合资、合作企业中国有资产的管理
第三十三条 企业单位用国有资产与外商开办合资、合作企业，在项目立项后，如用原有国有资产入股，必须向国有资产行政管理部门提出出资申请和进行资产评估，评估结果列入可行性研究报告，然后按技术改造正常程序办理有关手续。
第三十四条 企业单位与外商合资、合作，由国有资产行政管理部门会同有关部门根据评估结果，按照国家和自治区人民政府有关规定，合理确定底价，并以正式文件批复企业单位，准许其用国有资产出资。
第三十五条 企业单位应以国有资产行政管理部门出具的国有资产底价以上的价格与外商谈判出资合营、合作。
第三十六条 中外合资、合作企业正式成立后，中方投资者应将合资、合作企业的合同、章程及产权登记等有关批准文件、注册会计事务所验资证明资料，报同级国有资产行政管理部门和财政行政管理部门备案。
第三十七条 占有、使用国有资产的中外合资、合作企业，必须接受同级国有资产行政管理部门的监督。
第八章 法律责任
第三十八条 违反本条例规定，造成国有资产损失的，由同级国有资产行政管理部门按照下列规定处罚：
造成国有资产损失金额达五万元以下，属个人责任的，处相当于本人三个月基本工资以下的罚款。属单位责任的，处损失金额一倍的罚款。
造成国有资产损失金额五万元以上的，属个人责任的，处相当于本人三至六个月基本工资的罚款。属单位责任的，处损失金额一点五倍的罚款。
第三十九条 有下列情形之一的，由同级国有资产行政管理部门对直接责任人、单位负责人给予三个月基本工资以下的罚款：
（一）登记中隐瞒真实情况、弄虚作假的；
（二）擅自改变主要登记事项的；
（三）不按照规定办理注销登记或不按照规定报送年检报告书、办理年检的；
（四）伪造、涂改、出租、出借、出卖《国有资产授权占用证书》的；
（五）抽逃、转移、隐匿国有资产的。
第四十条 对单位的罚款，企业在公益金中支付，国家机关、社会团体、事业单位在预算外资金或包干结余经费中支付，预算外资金或者包干结余经费不足支付的，在单位经费中分期扣除，对个人的罚款由所在单位从本人工资中扣缴。罚款数额经国有资产行政管理部门同意可以分期交
纳。
罚款一律上缴财政，任何单位或个不得截留、侵占或者挪用。
第四十一条 对处罚决定不服的，可以在收到处罚决定书之日起十五日内向上一级国有资产行政管理部门申请复议，复议机关必须在接到申请复议后两个月内作出复议决定。当事人也可以直接向人民法院提起诉讼。逾期不申请复议不起诉，又不履行处罚决定的，作出处罚决定的部门可
以申请人民法院强制执行。
第四十二条 对违反本条例的国家股股权代表，国有资产行政管理部门可根据事实和情节，给予警告或撤销其国家股股权代表资格的处分。
第四十三条 凡违反本条例的直接责任人和单位负责人，根据情节轻重，由有关部门给予行政处分。触犯刑律的，由司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第九章 附 则
第四十四条 南宁市人民政府可以根据本条例制定实施细则。
第四十五条 本条例在具体运用中的问题，由南宁市国有资产行政管理部门负责解释。
第四十六条 本条例自公布之日起施行。
1994年4月2日
